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I. Introduction
The 2007–2008 financial crisis has been a catalyst for significant bank regulation reforms, as
the pre-crisis regulatory framework has been judged inadequate to cope with large financial
shocks. The new Basel III framework envisions a raise in bank capital requirements and the
introduction of new liquidity requirements, while several proposals have been recently advanced
to use forms of taxation with the twin objectives of raising funding to pay for resolution costs
in stressed times, as well as a way to control bank risk–taking behavior.1 To date, however, the
relatively large literature on bank regulation offers no formal analysis where a joint assessment
of these policies can be made in a dynamic model of banking where banks play a role and are
exposed to multiple sources of risk. The formulation of such a dynamic banking model is the
main contribution of this paper.
Our model is novel in three important dimensions. First, we analyze a bank that dynam-
ically transforms short term liabilities into longer–term partially illiquid assets whose returns
are uncertain. This feature is consistent with banks’ special role in liquidity transformation
emphasized in the literature (see e.g. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (2007)).
Second, we model bank’s financial distress explicitly. This allows us to examine optimal
banks’ choices on whether, when, and how to continue operations in the face of financial
distress. The bank in our model invests in risky loans and risk–less bonds financed by (random)
government-insured deposits and short–term debt. Financial distress occurs when the bank
is unable to honor part or all of its debt and tax obligations for given realizations of credit
and liquidity shocks. The bank has the option to resolve distress in three costly forms: by
liquidating assets at a cost, by issuing fully collateralized bonds, or by issuing equity. The
liquidation costs of assets are interpreted as fire sale costs, and modeled introducing asymmetric
costs of adjustment of the bank’s risky asset portfolio. The importance of fire sale costs in
amplifying banks financial distress has been brought to the fore in the recent crisis (see e.g.
Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2010) and Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011)).
1The new Basel III framework is detailed in Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient
banks and banking systems, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, June 2011. On taxation proposals, see
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) and Financial Sector Taxation, International Monetary
Fund, Washington D.C., September 2010.
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Third, we evaluate the impact of bank regulations and taxation not only on bank optimal
policies, but also in terms of metrics of bank efficiency and welfare. The first metric is the
enterprise value of the bank, which can be interpreted as the efficiency with which the bank
carries out its maturity transformation function. The second one, called “social value”, proxies
welfare in our risk-neutral world, as it summarizes the total expected value of bank activities
to all bank stakeholders and the government. To our knowledge, this is the first study that
evaluates the joint welfare implications of bank regulation and taxation.
Our benchmark bank is unregulated, but its deposits are fully insured. We consider this
bank as the appropriate benchmark, since one of the asserted roles of bank regulation is the
abatement of the excessive bank risk–taking arising from moral hazard under partial or total
insurance of its liabilities. We use a standard calibration of the parameters of the model —with
regulatory and tax parameters mimicking current capital regulation, liquidity requirement and
tax proposals— to solve for the optimal policies and the metrics of efficiency and welfare.
We obtain three sets of results. First, if capital requirements are mild, a bank subject
only to capital regulation invests more in lending and its probability of default is lower than
its unregulated counterpart. This additional lending is financed by higher levels of retained
earnings or equity issuance. Importantly, under mild capital regulation bank efficiency and
social values are higher than under no regulation, and their benefits are larger the higher are
fire sale costs. However, if capital requirements become too stringent, then the efficiency and
welfare benefits of capital regulation disappear and turn into costs, even though default risk
remains subdued: lending declines, and the metrics of bank efficiency and social value drop
below those of the unregulated bank. Thus, there exists an inverted-U-shaped relationship
between bank lending, efficiency, welfare and the stringency of capital requirements. These
novel findings suggest the existence of an optimal level of bank-specific regulatory capital under
deposit insurance.
Second, the introduction of liquidity requirements reduces bank lending, efficiency and so-
cial value significantly, since these requirements hamper bank maturity transformation. In
addition, the reduction in lending, efficiency, and social values increases monotonically with
their stringency. When liquidity requirements are added to capital requirements, they also
eliminate the benefits of mild capital requirements, since bank lending, efficiency and social
values are reduced relative to the bank subject to capital regulation only. We should stress
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that these results do not have to be necessarily interpreted as an indictment of liquidity re-
quirements. If liquidity requirements were found to be optimal regulations to correct some
negative externalities arising from excessive bank’s reliance on short term debt—which we
do not model—then our results indicate how large the costs associated with these negative
externalities should be to rationalize the need of liquidity requirements.
On taxation, an increase in corporate income taxes reduces lending, bank efficiency and
social values due to standard negative income effects. However, tax receipts increase, generating
higher government revenues. With the introduction of a tax on non-deposit liabilities, which
in our model is short–term debt, the decline in bank lending, efficiency and social values is
larger than that under an increase in corporate taxation, while the increase in government
tax receipts is lower. Therefore, in our model corporate taxation is preferable to a tax on
non–deposit liabilities, although both forms of taxation reduce lending, efficiency and social
value.
The remainder of this paper comprises five sections. Section II presents a brief review of
the literature. Section III describes the benchmark model of an unregulated bank. Section IV
introduces bank regulation and illustrates some basic trade-offs on optimal policies. Section V
details the impact of bank regulation and taxation. Section VI concludes. The Appendix
describes some properties of the bank’s dynamic program, a comparison of a bank closure rule
with capital requirements, and the computational procedures used to solve the model and run
simulations on the optimal solution.
II. A brief literature review
The literature on bank regulation is large, but it offers few formal analyses of the impact of
regulatory constraints on bank optimal policies in a dynamic framework.
The great majority of studies have focused on capital regulation. Capital requirements
has been typically justified by their role in curbing excessive risk–taking (risk–shifting or asset
substitution) induced by moral hazard of banks whose deposits are insured (for a review,
Freixas and Rochet (2008) and Lucas and Stokey (2011)). However, whether an increase in
capital requirements unambiguously reduces banks’ incentives to take on more risk appears
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an unsettled issue even in the context of static partial equilibrium models of banking. Several
studies, as for instance Besanko and Kanatas (1996), Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000),
and Repullo (2004), using partial equilibrium set–ups show that an increase in capital results in
reduced risk taking. However, in similar models like Blum (1999), and Calem and Rob (1999),
just to mention a few of them, this conclusion can be reversed. Such reversal can also occur
in general equilibrium set–ups (see e.g. Gale and O¨zgu¨r (2005), and De Nicolo` and Lucchetta
(2009) and Gale (2010)), with capital regulation potentially entailing high welfare costs, as in
Van den Heuvel (2008).
The relatively sparse literature of dynamic models of banking has mainly focused on the
pro-cyclicality aspects of bank capital regulation.2 Based on the experience of the 2007-2008
financial crisis, Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin (2009) have stressed
the role of pro–cyclicality as an important factor underlying the amplification of credit cy-
cles, and likely to increase the probability of so–called illiquidity spirals, in which the entire
banking system liquidates its assets at fire sale prices in a downturn, with adverse systemic
consequences. Even in this case, available results are mixed depending on the way the model
is specified: Estrella (2004) and Repullo and Suarez (2008) find that capital requirements are
indeed pro-cyclical, while Peura and Keppo (2006) and Zhu (2008) find that this may not
necessarily be the case.
A recent line of research has addressed the potential bank vulnerabilities arising from
reliance on wholesale funding, as in Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2011), or on the use
of short-term debt and maturity choice (Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2010), and Gale and
Yorulmazer, 2010). While these contributions have provided important insights on the costs
and benefits of market–based funding for banks, their implications have been only loosely linked
to the necessity of bank liquidity requirements. The only exception is the simple static model
of Perotti and Suarez (2011), where a liquidity requirement arises through an exogenously
imposed “externality” in the bank revenue function. To date, we know of no model that
assesses the impact of liquidity requirements in the context of well-defined banking optimal
policies where systemic liquidity risk arises endogenously. Finally, we are unaware of dynamic
banking models that analyze the impact of taxation on bank optimal policies, efficiency and
welfare.
2For a review of the pre-crisis literature on pro–cyclicality and some empirical evidence, see Zhu (2008) and
Panetta and Angelini (2009)).
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Zhu (2008) presents a modeling approach similar to ours. Extending the model by Cooley
and Quadrini (2001), he considers a bank that invests in a risky decreasing return to scale
technology, its sole source of financing are uninsured (and fairly priced) deposits, it faces linear
equity issuance costs, and is subject to minimum capital requirements. However, Zhu (2008)
considers the effect of neither maturity transformation, nor liquidity requirements or taxation,
which are important aspects of our results.
III. The model
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. We consider a bank that receives a random stream
of short term deposits, can issue risk–free short term debt, and invests in longer term assets
and short term bonds. The bank manager maximizes shareholders’ value, so there are no
managerial agency conflicts, and bank’s shareholders are risk–neutral.
A. Bank’s balance sheet
On the asset side, the bank can invest in a liquid, one–period bond (a T-bill), which yields a
constant risk–free rate rf , and in a portfolio of risky assets, called loans. We denote with Bt
the face value of the risk–free bond, and with Lt ≥ 0 the nominal value of the stock of loans
outstanding in period t (i.e., in the time interval (t− 1, t]). Similarly to Zhu (2008), we make
the following
Assumption 1 (Revenue function). The total revenue from loan investment is given by Ztpi(Lt),
where pi(Lt) satisfies conditions pi(0) = 0, pi > 0, pi
′ > 0, and pi′′ < 0.
This assumption is empirically supported, as there is evidence of decreasing return to scale
of bank investments.3 Loans may be viewed as including traditional loans as well as risky
securities. Zt is a random credit shock realized on loans in the same time period, which
captures variations in banks’ total revenues as determined, for example, by business cycle
conditions. Note that the choice variables Bt and Lt are set at the beginning of the period,
while Zt is realized only at the end of the period.
3See for instance, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005), Carter and McNulty (2005), Cole,
Goldberg, and White (2004).
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The maturity of deposits is set to one period. Bank maturity transformation is introduced
with the following
Assumption 2. (Loan reimbursement) A constant proportion δ ∈ (0, 1/2) of the existing stock
of loans at t, Lt, becomes due at t+ 1.
The parameter δ < 1/2 gauges the average maturity of the existing stock of loans, which is
1/δ − 1 > 1.4 Thus, the bank is engaging in maturity transformation of short term liabilities
into longer term investments. Under Assumption 2, the law of motion of Lt is
Lt = Lt−1(1− δ) + It, (1)
where It is the investment in new loans if it is positive, or the amount of cash obtained by
liquidating loans if it is negative.
To capture bank’s monitoring and liquidation costs, we introduce convex asymmetric ad-
justment costs as in the Q-theory of investment (see e.g. Abel and Eberly (1994)) with the
following
Assumption 3 (Loan Adjustment Costs). The adjustment costs function for loans is quadratic:
m(It) = |It|2
(
χ{It>0} ·m+ + χ{It<0} ·m−
)
, (2)
where χ{A} is the indicator of event A, and m+ > m− > 0 are the unit cost parameters.
In increasing its investment in loans, the bank incurs monitoring costs, whereas bank incur
liquidation costs when the loans are reduced. Adjustment costs are deducted from profit. The
asymmetry in the adjustment costs (m− > m+) captures costly reversibility: the bank faces
higher costs to liquidate investments rather then expanding them. The higher costs of reducing
the stock of loans can be interpreted as capturing fire sales costs incurred in financial distress.
4The (weighted) average maturity of existing loans at date t, assuming the bank does not default nor it
makes any adjustments on the current investment in loans, is
Mt =
∞∑
s=0
s
δLt+s
Lt
=
∞∑
s=0
sδ(1− δ)s = 1
δ
− 1,
as the residual loans outstanding at date t+ s, s ≥ 0, is Lt+s = Lt(1− δ)s.
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On the liability side, the bank receives a random amount of one-period deposits Dt at the
beginning of period t, and this amount remains outstanding during the period. The interest
rate on deposits is rd ≤ rf , where the difference between the risk–free rate and the remuneration
of deposits captures implicit costs of payment services possibly associated with deposits. The
stochastic process followed by Dt is detailed below. Deposits are insured according to the
following
Assumption 4 (Deposit insurance). The deposit insurance agency insures all deposits. In the
event the bank defaults on deposits and on the related interest payments, depositors are paid
interest and principal by the deposit insurance agency, which absorbs the relevant loss.
Under this assumption, with no change in the model, the depositor can be viewed as the
deposit insurance agency itself, and its claims are risky, while deposits are effectively risk–free
from depositors’ standpoint. Note that the difference between the ex–ante yield on deposits
and the risk–free rate also includes a subsidy that the agency provides to the bank, as the cost
of this insurance is not charged to either banks or depositors.
To fund operations, the bank can issue one–period bonds and equity. For tractability, we
follow Hennessy and Whited (2005) by assuming that the bank is constrained to issue fully
collateralized bonds, so that their yield is the risk–free rate. We denote Bt < 0 the notional
amount of the bond issued at t−1 and outstanding until t. The collateral constraint is described
below.
To summarize, at t−1 (i.e., at the beginning of period t), after the investment and financing
decisions have been made, the balance sheet equation is
Lt +Bt = Dt +Kt, (3)
where K denotes the ex–ante book value of equity, or bank capital. In this equation, B denotes
the face value of a risk–free investment when B > 0, and the face value of issued bond when
B < 0.
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B. Bank’s cash flow
Once Zt and Dt+1 are realized at t, the current state (before a decision is made) is summarized
by the vector xt = (Lt, Bt, Dt, Zt, Dt+1) as the bank enters date t with loans, bonds and
deposits in amounts Lt, Bt, and Dt, respectively. Prior to its investment, financing and cash
distribution decisions, the total internal cash available to the bank is
wt = w(xt) = yt − τ(yt) +Bt + δLt + (Dt+1 −Dt). (4)
Equation (4) says that total internal cash wt equals bank’s earnings before taxes (EBT),
yt = y(xt) = pi(Lt)Zt + rfBt − rdDt, (5)
minus corporate taxes τ(yt), plus the principal of one–year investment in bond maturing at t,
Bt > 0 (or alternatively the amount of maturing one–year debt, Bt < 0) and from loans that
are repaid, δLt, plus the net change in deposits, Dt+1 −Dt.
Consistently with current dynamic models of a non–financial firm (see e.g. Hennessy and
Whited (2007)), corporate taxation is introduced with the following
Assumption 5 (Corporate Taxation). Corporate taxes are paid according to the following
convex function of EBT:
τ(yt) = τ
+ max {yt, 0}+ τ−min{yt, 0}, (6)
where τ− and τ+, 0 ≤ τ− ≤ τ+ < 1, are the marginal corporate tax rates in case of negative
and positive EBT, respectively.
The assumption τ− ≤ τ+ is standard in the literature, as it captures a reduced tax benefit
from loss carryforward or carrybacks. Note that convexity of the corporate tax function creates
an incentive to manage cash flow risk, as noted by Stulz (1984).
Given the available cash wt as defined in Equation (4) and the residual loans, Lt(1 − δ),
bank’s managers choose the new level of investment in loans, Lt+1 and the amount of risk–free
bonds Bt+1 (purchased if positive, issued if negative). As a result, Equation (3) applies to
Bt+1, Lt+1, Dt+1, and both Lt+1 and Bt+1 remain constant until the next decision date, t+ 1.
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However, these choices may differ according to whether the bank is or is not in financial distress.
If total internal cash wt is positive, it can be retained or paid out to shareholders. If wt is
negative, the bank is in financial distress, since absent any action, it would be unable to honor
part, or all, of its obligations towards either the tax authority, or depositors, or bondholders.
When in financial distress, the bank can finance the shortfall wt either by selling loans at fire
sale prices, or by issuing bonds (Bt+1 < 0), or by injecting equity capital. However, overcoming
this shortage of liquidity is expensive, because all these transactions generate (either explicit
of implicit) costs. In a fire sale, the bank incurs the downward adjustment cost defined in
Equation (2), bond issuance is subject to a collateral restriction, and floatation costs are paid
when seasoned equity is offered. We now present these latter two restrictions on the banks’
financing channels.
Bank’s issuance of bonds is constrained by the following:
Assumption 6 (Collateral constraint). If Bt < 0, the amount of bond issued by the bank must
be fully collateralized. In particular, the constraint is
Lt −m(−Lt(1− δ)) + pi(Lt)Zd − τ(ymint ) +Bt(1 + rf )−Dt(1 + rd) +Dd ≥ 0, (7)
where Zd is the worst possible credit shock (i.e., the lower bound of the support of Z), Dd is
the worst case scenario flow of deposits, and ymint = pi(Lt)Zd + rfBt − rdDt is the EBT in the
worst case end–of–period scenario for current Lt, Bt and Dt.
The constraint in (7) reads as follows: the end–of–period amount Bt(1 + rf ) < 0 that the
bank has to repay must not be higher than the after–tax operating income, pi(Lt)Zd − rdDt −
τ(ymint ) in the worst case scenario, plus the total available cash obtained by liquidating the
loans, Lt−m(−Lt(1− δ)), plus the flow of new deposits in the worst case, Dd, net of the claim
of current depositors, Dt. The proceeds from loans liquidation are the sum of the loans that
will become due, Ltδ, plus the amount that can be obtained by a forced liquidation of the
loans, Lt(1− δ) net of the adjustment cost m(−Lt(1− δ)), as from Equation (2).5
5As per Assumption 9 introduced below, the support for deposits and credit shock processes is compact,
implying that the collateral constraint is well defined.
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We denote with Γ(Dt) the feasible set for the bank when the current deposit is Dt; i.e.,
the set of (Lt, Bt) such that condition (7) is satisfied, if Bt < 0, no restrictions being imposed
when Bt ≥ 0:
Γ(Dt) = {(Lt, Bt) |
Lt −m(−Lt(1− δ)) +Dd + pi(Lt)Zd(1− τ(ymint ))
1 + rd(1− τ(ymint ))
+Bt
1 + rf (1− τ(ymint ))
1 + rd(1− τ(ymint ))
≥ Dt,
Bt < 0} ∪ {Bt ≥ 0} . (8)
In the plane (Lt, Bt), the lower boundary of Γ(Dt), when Bt < 0, is convex due to concavity
of the revenue function. This means that a bank can fund more investment in risky loans by
issuing more risk–free one period bonds. However, this investment has decreasing return to
scale, and at some point the net return of a dollar raised by issuing bonds and invested in
loans becomes negative.
Bank’s costs on equity issuance are introduced to capture information asymmetries and
underwriting fees and are modeled in a standard fashion (see e.g. Cooley and Quadrini (2001))
with the following
Assumption 7 (Equity floatation costs). The bank raises capital by issuing seasoned shares
incurring a proportional floatation cost λ > 0 on new equity issued.
As a result of the choice of (Lt+1, Bt+1), the residual cash flow to shareholders at date t is
ut = u(xt, Lt+1, Bt+1) = wt −Bt+1 − Lt+1 + Lt(1− δ)−m(It+1). (9)
If ut is positive, it is distributed to shareholders (either as dividends or stock repurchases). If
ut is negative, it equals the amount of newly issued equity inclusive of the higher cost due to
underpricing. Hence, the actual cash flow to equity holders is
et = e(xt, Lt+1, Bt+1) = max{ut, 0}+ min{ut, 0}(1 + λ). (10)
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the state variables and the related bank’s decisions when
the bank is solvent.
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Lastly, bank’s insolvency occurs according to the following
Assumption 8 (Insolvency). In the case of default, bank shareholders exercise the limited
liability option (i.e., equity value is zero), and the assets are transferred to the deposit insurance
agency, net of verification and reorganization costs in proportion γ > 0 of the face value of
deposits, Dt. Right after default the bank is reorganized as a new entity endowed with deposits
Dt+1 and new capital Kt+1 = Du−Dt+1 ≥ 0, where Du is the upper bound of deposit process.
The restructured bank invests initially only in risk–free bonds, Bt+1 = Du, so that Lt+1 = 0.
This assumption embeds three features. First, restructuring costs are proportional to the
size of the bank, proxied by Dt. Second, since default is irreversible, a new bank financed with
initial public capital is formed to replace the defaulted bank in order to preserve intermediation
services in the economy. Third, the capital injected by the government in the new bank is
assumed to be financed with tax proceeds. Since no new shares are issued in the open market,
no floatation cost is incurred.
The probabilistic assumptions of our model are as follows. There are two exogenous sources
of uncertainty: the credit shock on the loan portfolio, Z, and the funding available from
deposits, D. Denote with s = (Z,D) the pair of state variables, and with S the state space.
Assumption 9. The state space S, is compact. The random vector s evolves according to a
stationary and monotone (risk–neutral) Markov transition function Q(st+1 | st) defined as
Zt − Zt−1 = (1− κZ)
(
Z − Zt−1
)
+ σZε
Z
t (11)
logDt − logDt−1 = (1− κD)
(
logD − logDt−1
)
+ σDε
D
t . (12)
The error terms εZt and ε
D
t are i.i.d and have jointly normal truncated distribution with cor-
relation coefficient ρ.6
In the above equations, κZ is the persistence parameter, σZ is the conditional volatility,
and Z is the long term average of the credit shock; κD is the persistence parameter for the
deposit process, σD is the conditional volatility, and D is the long term level of deposits.
6As detailed in Appendix C, in the simulations the support of each state variable is within three times the
unconditional standard deviation of each marginal distribution around the long term average.
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C. The unregulated bank program and the valuation of securities
Let E denote the market value of bank’s equity. Given the state, xt = (Lt, Bt, Dt, Zt, Dt+1),
bank’s equity value is the result of the following program
Et = E(xt) = max{(Li+1,Bi+1)∈Γ(Di+1),i=t,...,T}
Et
[
T∑
i=t
βi−te(xi, Li+1, Bi+1)
]
, (13)
where Et[·] is the expectation operator conditional on Dt, on the state variables at t, (Zt, Dt+1),
and on the decision (Lt+1, Bt+1); β is a discount factor (assumed constant for simplicity);
(Li+1, Bi+1) is the decision at date i, for i = t, . . ., and T is the default date. Because the
model is stationary and the Bellman equation involves only two dates (the current, t, and the
next one, t + 1), we can drop the time index t and use the notation without a prime for the
current value of the variables, and with a prime to denote end–of–period value of the variables.
The value of equity satisfies the following Bellman equation
E(x) = max
{
0, max
(L′,B′)∈Γ(D′)
{
e(x, L′, B′) + βE
[
E(x′)
]}}
. (14)
Compactness of the feasible set of the bank and standard properties of the value function
are described in Appendix A.
When the bank is solvent, the value of equity satisfies the following Bellman equation:
E(x) = max
(L′,B′)∈Γ(D′)
{
e(x, L′, B′) + βE
[
E(x′)
]}
. (15)
We denote with (L∗(x), B∗(x)) the optimal policy when the bank is solvent. When it is
insolvent, shareholders exercise the limited liability option, which puts a lower bound on E at
zero. The default indicator function is denoted ∆(x).7
7Given the collateral constraint, in the model default of the non–regulated bank may occur only when Bt > 0.
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We solve equation (14) to determine the value of equity, the optimal policy including the
optimal default policy, ∆, as a function of the current state, x. We denote ϕ, the state
transition function based on the optimal policy:
ϕ(x) =

L∗
B∗
D′
 (1−∆) +

0
Du
D′
∆, (16)
meaning that the new state is (L∗, B∗, D′) if the bank is solvent, and (0, Du, D′) if the bank
defaults and a new bank is started endowed with seed capital Du −D′ and deposits, D′, and
a cash balance Du, and no loans. This bank will revise its investment (together with the
financing) policy in the following decision dates.
The end–of–year cash flow from current deposits, Dt+1, for a given realization of the ex-
ogenous state variables, (Zt+1, Dt+2), and on the related optimal policy, is
f(xt+1 | ϕ(xt+1)) = Dt+1(1 + rd)(1− γ∆(xt+1)). (17)
Hence, the ex–ante fair value of newly issued deposits at t, from the viewpoint of the deposit
insurance agency (i.e, incorporating the risk of bank’s default), is
F (xt) = βEt [f(xt+1 | ϕ(xt+1))] = βDt+1(1 + rd) (1− γP (xt)) , (18)
where P (xt) = Et [∆(xt+1)] is the conditional default probability. Dropping the dependence
on the calendar date,
F (x) = βD′(1 + rd) (1− γP (x)) . (19)
D. Efficiency and welfare metrics
A standard valuation concept is the market value of bank assets E(x) + F (x), which includes
current cash holdings, B. Yet, the market value of bank’s assets does not necessarily capture
the role of banks as maturity transformers of liquid liabilities into longer term productive assets
(loans). One of the key economic contributions of banks identified in the literature is their role
in efficiently intermediating funds toward their best productive use (see e.g. Diamond (1984)
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and Boyd and Prescott (1986)). But banks play no such role if they just raise funds to acquire
risk–free (cash–equivalent) bonds. While bonds investment helps reducing the costs triggered
by high cash flows volatility, it is not providing necessarily efficient intermediation. Thus, the
enterprise value of the bank, defined as V (x) = E(x) + F (x)−B, is a suitable metric of bank
efficiency, as it captures banks ability to create “productive” intermediation.8
In our risk neutral world, a metric proxying welfare is “social value”, defined as the sum
of the values to the government and to the bank’s stakeholders, and which is constructed as
follows. A first component of social value is the value of the net payoff to the government,
defined by the recursive equation
G(x) = (1−∆(x)) (τ(y′) + βE[G(x′)])−∆(x) (γD +Kt+1) . (20)
with ∆ denoting the default indicator at x. Equation (20) reads as follows: so long as the
bank is solvent (∆ = 0), taxes are collected, where E[G(x′)] is the present value of future tax
proceeds. If the bank is insolvent (∆ = 1), then the government incurs direct bankruptcy costs
γD, and injects new equity capital Kt+1 = Du −Dt+1.
A second component of social value is the present value of expected equity floatation costs:
FC(x) = −λmin {u, 0}+ βE [FC(x′)] , (21)
where u is defined in equation (9). While underpricing of newly issued equity affects current
shareholders, it benefits new shareholders because they can buy a share in the bank’s capital
for a lower price. Therefore, equity floatation costs are not deadweight costs but just a wealth
transfer from old to new shareholders.
Finally, the social value of the bank is the sum of values to all the stakeholders in the model
SV (x) = E(x) +D −B +G(x) + FC(x), (22)
8For the use of enterprise value as a metric of efficiency in the context of dynamic models of non–financial
firms, see e.g. Gamba and Triantis (2008) and Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011).
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where D is the book value of current deposits. In essence, SV (x) captures the net impact on
welfare of stricter constraints on bank policies, which in general may reduce the value of the
bank’s loans and the flow of corporate taxes, but can also abate expected bailout costs.
IV. Bank regulation
In this section we define capital and liquidity requirements, illustrate their implications for
banks feasible choice sets, and examine some trade–offs on optimal policies they impose in the
context of a highly simplified version of our model.9
A. Capital requirement
In our model, Basel–type capital regulation establishes a lower bound Kd on the book value
of equity, set by the regulator as a function on bank’s risk exposure at the beginning of the
period. In particular, this requirement is a weighted average of banks risks. Since our model
has just one composite risky asset, we set the weight applied to loans equal to 100%. Thus,
in our setting the required capital Kd is at least a proportion k of the principal of the loans
at the beginning of the period, L, or Kd = kL. This requirement is equivalent to constraining
net worth to be positive ex–ante. Given the definition of bank capital in (3), under the capital
requirement, the bank’s feasible choice set is
Θ(D) = {(L,B) | (1− k)L+B ≥ D} . (23)
When we compare the feasible choice set under the collateral constraint in Equation (8) with the
feasible set under the capital requirement, in general neither Γ(D) ⊂ Θ(D) nor Θ(D) ⊂ Γ(D)
in a proper sense. Hence, the capital requirement may (or may not) restrict the bank’s feasible
policies, depending on the values of the parameters. Figure 2 shows how the capital requirement
is related to the collateral constraint for a specific set of parameters.
9There is a literature examining the impact of bank closure rules that may augment standard regulation.
In Appendix B we examine one such rule, and show that it may complement capital regulation under some
assumptions about bank reorganization costs.
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If the bank is short term borrowing, B < 0, for a given D the capital constraint results in
a restriction of the bank’s choice set if Θ(D) ⊂ Γ(D). This is equivalent to
L−m(−L(1− δ)) +Dd + pi(L)Zd(1− τ(ymin))
1 + rf (1− τ(ymin)) ≥ (1− k)L. (24)
Since the inequality above is independent of D, what follows holds for any current D. If we
assume a constant corporate tax rate (in place of two tax rates: τ+ and τ−) for the sake of
simplicity, for a large range of values of the model parameters and of L, the above inequality
is satisfied. This means that the capital requirement restricts the bank’s policy. Alternatively,
if the bank is short term lending, B ≥ 0, then the capital requirement restricts the choice set
if L < D/(1 − k), because it forces the bank to have a fairly large cash balance B, while the
constraint is not binding if L ≥ D/(1− k).
The Bellman equation for the equity value of a currently solvent bank under a capital
requirement is given by Equation (15), the only difference being a feasible set Γ(D′) ∩ Θ(D′)
in place of Γ(D′), since the bank is forced to comply ex–ante with the capital requirement.
However, at the end of the period, when the credit shock on existing loans Z ′ and the new
deposit D′ are realized, the bank may still face default risk if the innovations of the state
variables are particularly unfavorable.
B. Liquidity requirement
Current Basel III regulation introduces a mandatory liquidity coverage ratio: banks would be
prescribed to hold a stock of high quality liquid assets such that the ratio of this stock over
what is defined as a net cash outflows over a 30-day time period is not lower than a certain
percentage threshold. In turn, the net cash outflow is expected to be determined by what
would be required to face an acute short term stress scenario specified by supervisors. Banks
would need to meet this requirement continuously as a defense against the potential onset of
severe liquidity stress.
In our model, the stock of high quality liquid assets over the net cash outflows over a period
is given by the total cash available at the end of the period over the total net cash flow in the
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worst case scenario for both credit shocks and deposit flows. Formally, this liquidity coverage
ratio should be not lower than a level ` defined by the regulator, or
δL+ Zdpi(L)− τ(ymin) +B(1 + rf )
D(1 + rd)−Dd ≥ `. (25)
Hence, the feasible set for a bank complying with the liquidity requirement is
Λ(D) =
{
(L,B) | δL+ `Dd + Zdpi(L)(1− τ(y
min))
`(1 + rd)− τ(ymin)rd +B
(1 + rf (1− τ(ymin)))
`(1 + rd)− τ(ymin)rd ≥ D
}
. (26)
For a bank that is short term borrowing, B < 0, the liquidity constraint restricts the
feasible choice set, or Λ(D) ⊂ Γ(D), if
L−m(−L(1− δ)) +Dd + Zdpi(L)(1− τ(ymin))
1 + rf (1− τ(ymin)) ≥
δL+Dd + Zdpi(L)(1− τ(ymin))
(1 + rf (1− τ(ymin))) ,
or equivalently, if L(1 − δ) ≥ (L(1 − δ))2m−. This is indeed the case for a wide range of
parameters and a large set of values of L. Moreover, the liquidity constraint always restricts
the feasible choice set when the bank is short term lending, B > 0.
Figure 2 shows a comparison of the liquidity requirement to the collateral constraint for
a specific choice of parameters. The liquidity constraint may turn out to restrict the bank’s
feasible choice set relative to the collateral constraint for a wide range of parameter values.
In sum, when considered together, capital and liquidity constraints may create considerable
restrictions on bank’s feasible choices, as we show momentarily.
C. Bank regulation in a simplified version of the model
To illustrate some trade–offs on bank optimal policies implied by regulatory restrictions in the
simplest way, we collapse our model to two periods. Now t is the decision date, t + 1 is the
final date, and the bank initial conditions are determined at t− 1.
We make the following simplifying assumptions. There are no taxes, no adjustment costs,
deposits are deterministic and constant (Dt = Dt+1 = D > 0, and Dt+2 = 0 since t + 1 is
the last period), δ = 0, β ≤ (1 + rf )−1, and rd) = rf . Furthermore, we assume a simple two–
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point credit shock distribution: ZH with probability p ∈ (0, 1), and ZL otherwise, where ZL
is such that Zd =
ZLLt+1
pi(Lt+1)
, with ZH > 0 ≥ ZL ≥ −1. Under these assumptions, the collateral
constraint for Bt+1 < 0, denoted with (C), the capital constraint, denoted with (K), and the
liquidity constraint, denoted with (L), are:
Bt+1 ≥ rd
1 + rf
D − 1 + Z
L
1 + rf
Lt+1 (C)
Bt+1 ≥ D − (1− k)Lt+1 (K)
Bt+1 ≥ `rd
1 + rf
D − Z
L
1 + rf
Lt+1 (L)
Recall that as per equation (10), the cash flow to shareholders is ut = wt+Lt−Bt+1−Lt+1
if ut > 0, and ut(1 + λ) if ut < 0, as the bank issues new equity at a cost λ > 0. We discuss
both cases at the same time by setting λ to either zero or to a positive value.
The bank chooses (Lt+1, Bt+1) to maximize
et + βEt [et+1] = (wt + Lt)(1 + λ)− (1 + λ− βp(1 + rf ))Bt+1 − (1 + λ)Lt+1
+ β
[
p
(
ZHpi(Lt+1)− (1 + rd)D + Lt+1
)
+ (1− p) max{0, (1 + ZL)Lt+1 + (1 + rf )Bt+1 − (1 + rd)D)}] (27)
Since 1 +λ > βp(1 + rf ), it is optimal to maximize debt (Bt+1 < 0), because in the good state
profits are increasing in debt, while in the bad state losses are bounded to be non-negative by
limited liability. This implies that at most one of the constraints (C), (K), and (L) will be
binding.
The unregulated bank maximizes (27) subject to constraint (C). Inserting (C) into (27),
the term max{·} in the third line of (27) vanishes, and the optimal loan level Lct+1 satisfies the
(necessary and sufficient) first order condition
βpZHpi′(Lct+1) = 1 + λ− βp− (1 + λ− βp(1 + rf ))
1 + ZL
1 + rf
. (28)
Suppose now that the capital constraint (K) is tighter than (C), that is, (K) is binding.
The third line of (27) is max{0, (1 + ZL − (1 + rf )(1− k))Lt+1}.
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The optimal loan investment when (K) is binding, defined by Lkt+1, satisfies:
βpZHpi′(Lkt+1) = 1 + λ− βp− (1 + λ− βp(1 + rf ))(1− k). (29)
By comparing the right–hand–sides of (28) and (29), it is straightforward to verify that Lkt+1 >
Lct+1 when (1 + Z
L) < (1 + rf )(1− k), due to the strict concavity of function pi.
Observe that the inequality (1 +ZL) < (1 + rf )(1− k) may hold for relatively low levels of
k, but it is reversed for values of k close to one. Thus, there may exist a threshold value kˆ such
that Lkt+1 < L
c
t+1 for all k > kˆ. In other words, under a sufficiently “mild” capital constraint
(or k < kˆ), lending can be higher than in the unregulated case, and this is true whether λ = 0
or λ > 0.
Thus, when (K) is binding, depending on parameters, lending could be higher than in the
unregulated case under mild capital requirements even though borrowing is lower (Bkt+1 > B
c
t+1
holds when constraint (K) is more stringent than (C)). This is because the capital requirement
lowers the return of holding cash relative to the expected return on loan investment.
In sum, there may exist parameter configurations such that the relationship between loans
and capital requirements is inverted U-shaped. Interestingly, this result may hold for any
λ ≥ 0.
Consider now the addition of a liquidity requirement to the capital requirement. Inspecting
constraints (L) and (C), it can be seen that the liquidity constraint is always tighter than the
collateral constraint when ` ≤ 1. Moreover, suppose that the liquidity constraint (L) is tighter
than (K) at the optimal choice Lkt+1, that is, (L) is binding. Replacing (L) in (27), the max{·}
term turns into max{0, Lt+1 + (rf (`− 1)− 1)D}.
If at the optimal solution Lt+1 + (rf (`− 1)− 1)D ≤ 0, then L`t+1 satisfies
pZHpi′(L`t+1) = rf − (1− p)ZL. (30)
Otherwise, L`t+1 satisfies
pZHpi′(L`t+1) = rf − ZL. (31)
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Comparing (28) with (30), it is easy to verify that the right hand side of (29) is always
strictly lower than that of (30) and (31). By strict concavity of the revenue function, this
implies that L`t+1 < L
k
t+1: the liquidity constraint unambiguously reduces lending relative to
the bank subject to a (binding) mild capital constraint. Comparing (28) with (31), the same
result is obtained if p is close to 1. Thus, there exist parameter configurations such that the
liquidity constraint reduces lending relative to the capital constraint. Note again that this
result holds for any λ ≥ 0.
Summing up, we have used a radical simplification of our model to illustrate cases —
depending on parameters— in which lending may increase under a capital requirement, and
may exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship with the stringency of capital regulation, while
liquidity requirements may reduce lending. These conclusions may or may not hold under com-
plex dynamic trade-offs arising from multiple sources of risk, asymmetric adjustment costs, and
endogenous choices of default that characterize the full version of our model, whose solutions
are analyzed next.
V. The impact of bank regulation and taxation
Our evaluation of the impact of bank regulation and taxation on banks’ optimal policies and
the two metrics defined previously proceeds as follows. First, we describe a set of benchmark
parameters calibrated using selected statistics from U.S. banking data, some previous studies,
and current regulatory and tax parameters under which we carry out our simulation exercise
(Subsection A). Then, we present the results of the optimal bank policies and relevant metrics
for given realized states (Subsection B). Subsection C reports the results a steady state analysis,
where we report statistics of the steady state distributions of optimal policies and our metrics
under different sets of bank regulation and taxation parameters, and examine the differential
impact of bank regulations for different parameters indexing equity issuance costs, fire sale
costs and the degree of bank maturity transformation.
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A. Calibration
Our calibration of the model is based on three sets of parameters, summarized in Table I. The
first set comprises parameters of the two exogenous state variables. We estimated the VAR of
equations (11) and (12) using U.S. yearly aggregate time series for the period 1983-2009 for the
entire universe of banks included in the Federal Reserve Call Reports constructed by Corbae
and D’Erasmo (2011). The shock process was proxied by the return on bank investments
before taxes, given by the ratio of interest and non-interest revenues to total lagged assets. As
can be seen in Table I, the shock process exhibits high persistence and the correlation with the
process of (log)deposit is negative. Estimates of the autocorrelation process for (log) deposit
produced estimates closed to unity, indicating the possibility that such process has a unit root.
To guarantee convergence of the fixed point algorithm, we set this parameter equal to 0.95.
The second set of parameters is taken from previous research. The annual discount factor
β is 0.95, equal to that used by Zhu (2008) and Cooley and Quadrini (2001). The risk–free
rate, rf , is set to 2.5% and the deposit rate, rd, is set to 0. These values are consistent with
the average effective cost of funds documented in Corbae and D’Erasmo (2011). With regard
to corporate taxation, recall that the tax function is defined by the marginal tax rates, τ+ and
τ−, for positive and negative income, respectively. Since we do not explicitly consider dividend
and capital gain taxation for shareholders or interest taxation for depositors and bond holders,
the two marginal rates for corporate taxes are to be considered net of the effect of personal
taxes. For this reason we choose τ+ = 15%, which is close to the values determined by Graham
(2000) for the marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rate for negative income is τ− = 5% to
allow for convexity in the corporate tax schedule.
Furthermore, the proportional bankruptcy cost is γ = 0.10, This is a value close to the
(structural) estimate of 0.104 for this cost based on U.S. non–financial firms found by Hennessy
and Whited (2007). Since this estimate is based on nonfinancial firms, it can be viewed as a
lower bound for bankruptcy costs incurred in the financial sector. The annual percentage of
reimbursed loan is 20%, so that the average maturity of outstanding loans is 4 years, in line
with the assumption made by Van den Heuvel (2009). The floatation cost for seasoned equity
issuance is 10%. This means the bank incurs a significant transaction cost to tap the equity
capital market when in financial distress.
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We specify the revenue function from loan investment as pi(L) = Lα, as in Zhu (2008),
and set our base case value for α to 0.90, which is in line with the one used in other papers.
Lastly, we set m+ = 0.03 and m− = 0.04 by matching two moments from empirical data. The
first moment is the average Bank Credit over Deposit ratio, in which bank credit is loans and
other financial investments. From our dataset, this is 1.271. The second moment we match is
bank’s book leverage, or deposits plus other financing liabilities over loans and other financial
investments. In the data, the average book leverage is 0.89. The corresponding uncondi-
tional moments from a Monte Carlo simulation of the model with the selected parameters are
respectively 1.1098 and 0.9031.
The third set of parameters is based on regulatory prescriptions. In our case, these are
the ratio of capital to risk–weighted assets and the liquidity coverage ratio. The benchmark
capital ratio k is set to 4%, while the benchmark liquidity ratio is set to ` = 0.2.
B. State-dependent analysis
In this section we illustrate the impact of bank regulations on optimal policies and our metrics
of bank efficiency and welfare for given realizations of the states. Although based on a specific
realization of the state variables, this analysis is instrumental in evaluating the impact of bank
regulations along the business and liquidity cycles. Three cases are considered: the unregulated
bank, the bank subject to capital regulation only, and that subject to both capital regulation
and liquidity requirements.
While many states can be possibly chosen, we set our analysis at the steady state for both
deposits (D = 2) and credit shock (Z = 0.0717), while choosing B = 0 to avoid the impact of
current liquidity, and L = 4.1, which is very close to the unconditional median of L for several
versions of the model. As a result, bank’s capital is K = 2.1. Figure 3 depicts the impact of
regulatory restrictions on loan investment and short term investment and financing. Tables II
and III report average capital ratios and liquidity coverage ratios for a solvent bank under the
three cases as functions of different levels of credit shocks and different levels of bank capital
at a point in time.
Consider first the unregulated bank. Figure 3 shows that when D′ is low (liquidity shock)
or Z is low (credit shock), the bank reduces short term debt and liquidates loans. Conversely,
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with an expansion both in liquidity (high D′) or more favorable credit shocks (high Z), there is
an increase in loan investment. It is important to note that the loan policy of an unregulated
bank is pro-cyclical, since loans vary positively with credit and liquidity conditions. Thus, pro-
cyclicality of lending is a feature of an optimal policy independently of capital requirements.
As shown in Table II and Table III, the resulting average capital and liquidity coverage ratios
are negative in all cases. This means that the unregulated bank takes an exposure in loans so
that, in the worst case scenario for the credit and the liquidity shocks, a forced liquidation of
loans is likely needed. In essence, the bank is trading off liquidation costs with the benefits of
a larger investment in loans.
Consider now the bank subject to capital regulation only. Relative to the unregulated
bank, Figure 3 shows that this bank takes less debt This is one possible scenario identified
in the simplified model under a mild capital requirement. Under the benchmark parameter-
ization, equation (23) implies that the bank satisfies the capital requirement by increasing
loans at a rate proportionally higher than the capital ratio coefficient. In essence, a “mild”
capital requirements induces a reduction of the rate of return of holding cash relative to the
expected returns on loans, prompting a higher investment in loans. With regard to lending pro-
cyclicality, Figure 3 also shows that loans vary positively with credit and liquidity conditions,
as in the case of the unregulated bank. However, under the benchmark parameterization, the
pro-cyclicality of lending relative to the unregulated case does not appear to be significantly
enhanced by capital requirements, as the slope of the relevant loan policies are almost parallel.
This result is similar to those obtained by Peura and Keppo (2006) and Zhu (2008). As shown
in Table II, the capital ratio is constantly higher than the prescribed level of 4%, due to the
(shadow) cost of the capital requirement, which prompts the bank to use retained earnings as
a precautionary tool to avoid hitting the constraint. Moreover, this ratio is increasing with
respect to the credit shock, and in general it is lower the higher the current K. As shown
in Table III, the average liquidity coverage ratio of this bank is higher than its unregulated
counterpart, owing to the higher level of loan investment and a less than proportional increase
in short term financing, which raises the numerator of Equation (25).
By adding a liquidity requirement to a capital requirement, Figure 3 shows that both debt
and investment levels shrink substantially. As we have seen with our example of a simplified
version of the model, and as is apparent in Figure 2, the liquidity requirement turns out
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to be far more restrictive than the capital requirement for large enough L, correspondingly
forcing the bank to reduce both debt and loan investment. The dominant tightness of the
liquidity requirement is also reflected in the average capital ratios and the liquidity coverage
ratios reported in Tables II and III respectively. The average capital ratio under a liquidity
requirement becomes inflated relative to the previous case, and is pushed up by a relatively
large net bond holding (the numerator) and a lower investment in loans (the denominator).
Note that this mechanism is totally different from that induced by capital regulation: in
that case, the capital ratio is ultimately pushed up by retained earnings and possibly equity
issuance. Not surprisingly, the average liquidity coverage ratio is higher than the prescribed
level (` = 20%), since the (shadow) cost associated with the liquidity constraint forces the
bank to hold precautionary cash to avoid hitting that constraint.
Turning to our efficiency and welfare metrics, Figure 4 shows enterprise and social values
divided by the corresponding values for the unregulated case for the bank subject to capital
regulation, as well as that subject to both capital regulation and liquidity requirements. With
regard to capital regulation, there is a value loss in both metrics, since the relevant ratios are
all below one. The value losses associated with capital regulation are more severe the lower
are the levels of new deposits and the credit shock. This is because in a downturn, during
which credit quality deteriorates, the bank is forced to liquidate more loans, thereby incurring
in significant liquidation (fire sale) costs. With regard to the bank subject to capital regulation
and liquidity requirements, Figure 4 also shows that the losses of efficiency and social value are
significantly larger than those under capital regulation only, reflecting the significant stringency
of the liquidity requirement.
C. Steady state analysis
We now turn to the analysis of the steady state distribution of optimal policies and metrics of
efficiency and welfare, obtained through numerical results based on Monte Carlo simulation.
Recall that a bank is represented by the set of parameters governing credit and liquidity
shocks, its revenue function, the maturity of its loan portfolio, and loan adjustment costs. We
subject this bank to a large number of shocks, and compute statistics of its optimal policies and
our metrics. These statistics can be interpreted in two complementary ways: they represent
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the steady state behavior of a “theoretical” bank subject to all possible shock realizations, or
they can be viewed as representing the average optimal steady state policies and metrics of a
banking industry in which each bank is represented by a particular path of shocks.
Specifically, we simulate a random sample of 10,000 paths of the exogenous shocks (or 10,000
possible scenarios this bank may face) of 100 annual periods each, and apply the optimal policy
to these random paths. To better approximate the steady state distribution of policies and
metrics and reduce the dependence on the initial state, we drop the first 50 periods. Hence, we
obtain a panel of 50 years for the 10,000 scenarios of a bank, or 10,000 banks in the industry,
and report the mean and standard deviation of the relevant policies and metrics. Here and
in the sequel, in illustrating our results, all differences in means we note are also statistically
significant according to standard tests, unless otherwise indicated.
C.1. The impact of bank regulation
Table IV presents these statistics when the bank is unregulated, when it is subject to cap-
ital requirements only, or when it is subject to both capital and liquidity requirements for
benchmark parameters and deviations from benchmarks.
Compared to the unregulated bank, the bank operating under a “mild” capital requirement
(base case, or k = 4%) invests more in loans and holds more debt, with the increase in debt
significantly smaller than the increase in loans. Since deposits are not a control variable
and follow the same exogenous process of the unregulated case, the regulated bank can fund
this additional investment increasing retained earnings and equity issuance. Specifically, from
equations (9) and (10), given the choice of Lt+1 and Bt+1, more earnings are retained from wt
or shares (incurring floatation costs λ) are issued if wt is negative.
As a result of these optimal policies, the bank holds a higher capital ratio than that pre-
scribed by regulation. This is because the positive shadow price of the capital constraint forces
the bank to manage its earnings and investments so as to maintain a capital buffer to minimize
the risk that the constraint is hit. When such constraint is hit, it can become too expensive
for the bank to inject new equity capital to comply with the regulatory restriction. These
results are consistent with the empirical evidence regarding banks holding (ex–ante) capital
larger than required by regulations, as in Flannery and Kasturi (2008). Importantly, capital
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regulation results in a bank with a lower probability of default than in the unregulated case.
Thus, a capital requirement is successful in abating default risk under deposit insurance.
Remarkably, mild capital regulation implies an increase in the efficiency of intermediation,
since the enterprise value is larger than the one attained by the unregulated bank. This suggests
that the unregulated bank, relative to the bank subject to capital regulation, is inefficiently
under-investing in loans, as it prefers to payout earnings rather than retaining them to support
loan investment. The social value of the bank is also larger than in the unregulated case, due to
both higher enterprise and government values. The higher government value stems from higher
tax receipts accruing from a larger taxable profit base, as well as from a lower probability of
bank default, which reduces expected bailout costs.
However, capital regulation needs to be “mild” for the efficiency and welfare benefits of
capital regulation to materialize. An increase in the capital requirement (from k = 4% to
k = 12%) results in a significant reduction in loans as well as indebtedness. Recall that the
bank was satisfying a “mild” capital requirement by an increase in loans financed in small part
with debt, and in larger part with higher retained earnings or equity issuance. However, when
the capital requirement becomes too stringent, such a strategy becomes too costly: payouts
need to be significantly reduced, and it becomes too expensive to raise new equity capital due
to equity issuance costs. Thus, the bank is compelled to reduce both loan investments and
further reduce debt. Furthermore, the increase in the capital requirement impacts negatively
on bank’s efficiency and social value. The bank enterprise value declines significantly, and such
decline accounts for the bulk of the decline in bank’s social value. This means that the benefits
of a mild capital regulation (relative to the unregulated case) disappear as the cost of capital
regulation increases more than proportionally with its stringency beyond a certain threshold.
Equivalently, this result suggests the existence of an optimal level of regulatory capital as a
function of banks’ characteristics.
Turning to the case of a bank subject to both capital regulation and liquidity requirement,
results are significantly different from the previous ones. Relative to bank subject only to a
“mild” capital requirements (the base case), lending is significantly reduced, and enterprise,
government and social values are all significantly lower in the base case with capital and
liquidity restrictions. As already noted, the liquidity requirement results in an over–bloated
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book capital ratio. Such a ratio may be viewed as an indication of a safe but a very inefficient
bank or banking industry.
Furthermore, an increase in the capital requirement (from k = 4% to k = 12%) for the
bank subject to a liquidity requirement (` = 20%) implies negligible changes in both loans and
in indebtedness, as well as in the efficiency and welfare metrics. This is because the dominance
of the liquidity requirement in constraining bank’s decisions allows the bank to respond to an
increase in the capital requirement only in a limited way. On the other hand, an increase in
the liquidity requirement (from ` = 20% to ` = 50%, with constant k = 4%) again reduces
loans and short term debt due to the mechanisms already discussed. In all these cases, both
the efficiency and welfare metrics are significantly reduced.
Two key results emerge from this analysis. First, capital requirements can achieve the twin
objectives of abating banks’ incentives to take on excessive risk induced by deposit insurance
and limited liability, and increase efficiency and welfare. However, if these requirements are
too strict, then the benefits of capital regulation disappear, and the associated efficiency and
social costs may be significant.
Second, liquidity requirements are associated with significant costs in terms of reductions
in lending, bank efficiency and welfare. As noted earlier, these costs might be justified if
negative externalities due to excessive bank shortterm indebtedness may give rise to systemic
risk consequences. However, measuring the benefits arising from a role of liquidity requirements
in preventing systemic financial crises is difficult and an open research area. In this regard,
our contribution is to provide an estimate of the costs associated with these requirements: the
magnitude of the benefits associated with liquidity requirements arising from systemic concern
should at least compensate for the costs we have identified.
C.2. The impact of taxation
A variety of taxes on financial institutions have been recently proposed or enacted.10 The
justifications of these taxes are: a) to address the budgetary costs of the crisis (ex-post), b) to
create resolution funds to address future distress (ex-ante), c) to better align bank managers’
incentives to target levels of bank risks, and d) to control systemic risk in the banking system.
10See Financial Sector Taxation, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., September 2010.
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Pigouvian taxation has also been proposed to internalize the negative externalities arising from
collective bank failures.11 Particular emphasis has been placed on taxes on bank liabilities,
with some stressing their potential role as a complement to bank regulation.
Here we examine the impact of changes in taxation on optimal policies and the efficiency
and welfare metrics of a bank subject to both capital regulation and liquidity requirements.
Specifically, we compare the effects of an increase of corporate income taxes relative to the
benchmark, with those resulting from the imposition of a tax of non–deposit liabilities.
We consider an increase in taxation of bank’s income (from τ+ = 15% and τ− = 5% to
τ+ = 20% and τ− = 7.5%), and compare this increase with the imposition of a flat tax rate
τB on banks’ non-deposit liabilities. We set τB = 0.005, which is a value in the range of taxes
currently in place or proposed.12 Under this scheme, the tax revenue is −τB min{0, B}, and
we assume that these taxes are deductible from earnings for income taxation purposes. The
results are in Table V.
For the bank subject to capital regulation only, higher corporate income taxes reduce loans
and indebtedness, owing to a negative income effect. Moreover, both the enterprise value and
the social value of the bank are reduced, although higher tax receipts increase government value.
When we consider the bank subject to both capital regulation and liquidity requirements, the
results are similar: loans, enterprise and social values are all reduced, while government value
increases.
Turning on the impact of a tax on non-deposit liabilities, consider first a bank subject to
capital regulation. The introduction of this tax results in a decline in lending and indebtedness
sharper than under the increase in income taxation. This is because the bank reduces debt—
hence, lending—as debt becomes more expensive, but the bank cannot substitute debt with
deposits, since the latter are exogenous. Both enterprise and social values decrease relative to
the base case, indicating (percent–wise) non-trivial efficiency and social costs associated with
this form of taxation, despite the fact that government value increases as total tax revenues
rise.
11Current proposals include systemic risk levies designed to mimic such Pigouvian levies. See, for example,
Acharya and Richardson (2009), Perotti and Suarez (2011), and for a critical evaluation see Shackelford, Shaviro,
and Slemrod (2010).
12See the relevant tables in Financial Sector Taxation, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.,
September 2010. Note that our metrics, as well as the collateral constraint and the liquidity constraints,
are reformulated to incorporate these taxes
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When we consider a bank subject to both capital regulation and liquidity requirements,
the effects of this taxation on lending, and the efficiency and welfare metrics are essentially
muted, since on average the bank holds no debt (net bond holdings are positive) owing to a
stringent liquidity requirement. In practice, the presence of a liquidity requirement dampens
the effects of this tax.
In sum, the negative impact on lending, efficiency and social value associated with income
taxes is significantly lower than that associated with a tax on deposit liabilities. In terms of
government value, income taxes dominate non-deposit taxation under our benchmark param-
eterization.
C.3. The role of equity issuance costs, fire sales and maturity transformation
In this section we assess the differential impact of bank regulation on bank steady state optimal
policies, and metrics of efficiency and welfare under different parameters of costs of equity
issuance and fire sales, and the degree of banks maturity transformation. Namely, we consider:
no cost of equity issuance, and an increase of λ from the benchmark value 0.1 to 0.2; a
doubling of “fire sale” costs, m−, from 0.04 to 0.08; a reduction of δ, the parameter gauging
maturity transformation, from 20% to 10%, indicating a longer loan maturity (from 4 years
to 9 years) and correspondingly a higher maturity mismatch. Table VI reports the results for
a bank subject to capital requirements only, and for one subject to both capital and liquidity
requirements.
To what extent the cost of equity issuance contributes to determine the inverted U-shaped
relationship between lending, efficiency, welfare, and the stringency of capital requirements?
On the one hand, with no equity issuance costs the U-shaped relationship is strengthened.
This is not surprising, since distress can be faced at a lower cost by the bank, allowing it to
increase its lending under a even higher capital requirement. On the other hand, doubling
equity issuance costs relative to the already significantly high benchmark generates a decline
in lending, enterprise and social values, but this decline is relatively small. Note that these
results hold for a bank subject to capital requirements only, as well as for one subject to both
capital and liquidity requirements. Thus, the role of the cost of equity issuance in determining
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the costs of more stringent capital requirements appears relatively less important than the
management of retained earnings.
Downward adjustment costs are proxies of fires sales costs. As noted, fire sales have been
identified as one of the key sources of systemic risk in the financial crisis of 2007-2009 (see
e.g. Kashyap, Brener, and Goodhart (2011)) When we double the relevant parameter in our
simulation, we find that lending, enterprise and social values all increase. Note that such
increase is found not only for the bank subject to capital requirements, but also for that
subject to both capital and liquidity requirements. This result reveals again the key role of
retaining earnings in supporting bank optimal choices: when facing higher fire sales costs, the
bank will respond by increasing lending and retained earnings in such a way the latter would
minimize the probability of incurring in fire sales costs in the event of distress. However, note
that the addition of liquidity requirements to capital requirements still results in a significant
worsening of lending and the efficiency and welfare metrics, as in all previous simulations.
Therefore, the efficiency and welfare improving role of “mild” capital requirements may be
even more important when fire sale costs are high.
Lastly, we have stressed the role of liquidity requirements in hampering the maturity trans-
formation function of a bank. This is starkly illustrated by the case in which a bank lengthens
the maturity of its loans. Under capital requirements only, the bank with a larger maturity
mismatch undertakes a more intense maturity transformation, as witnessed by higher levels
of lending and indebtedness relative to the bank with a milder maturity mismatch. When
liquidity requirements are added to capital requirements, however, the reduction in lending,
enterprise value and social value is significantly greater than that witnessed by the bank whose
loan maturity is shorter. Again, liquidity requirements turn out to be most detrimental to
lending, efficiency and welfare, the more intense is the transformation of short term liabilities
into longer term assets.
VI. Conclusions
This paper has formulated a dynamic model of a bank exposed to credit and liquidity risk
that can face financial distress by reducing loans, issuing secured debt, or issuing equity at a
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cost. We evaluated the joint impact of capital regulation, liquidity requirements and taxation
on banks’ optimal policies and metrics of bank efficiency of and welfare.
We have uncovered an important inverted U-shaped relationship between bank lending,
bank efficiency, social value and regulatory capital ratios. This result suggests the existence
of optimal levels of regulatory capital, which are likely to be highly bank-specific, depending
crucially on the configuration of risks a bank is exposed to as a function of the chosen busi-
ness strategies. Similarly, our results on the high costs of liquidity requirements point out the
adverse consequences of the repression of the key maturity transformation role of bank inter-
mediation. Given our finding of the adverse effects of liquidity requirements, the argument by
Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2011) that capital requirements can be designed
to substitute for liquidity requirements is reinforced. Finally, for the purpose of rising tax rev-
enues, corporate income taxation seems preferable to taxation of non-deposit liabilities, since
the former generates higher revenues and lower efficiency and welfare costs.
Overall, our results suggest that implementing non-trivial increases in capital requirements,
liquidity requirements and taxation may be associated with costs significantly larger than
what proponents of these policies may have thought. This implies that the benefits of these
requirements in terms of their ability to abate systemic risk should at least offset the costs we
have identified.
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Appendix
A. Properties of the unregulated bank program
Compactness of the feasible set of the bank can be shown as follows. Given the strict concavity
of pi(L), there exists a level Lu such that pi(Lu)Zu − rLu = 0, where r is the cost of capital
of the marginal dollar raised either through deposits or short term financing.13 Thus, any
investment L > Lu would be unprofitable. This establishes an upper bound on the feasible
set of L, given by [0, Lu] for some Lu. With an upper bound on L, and because the stochastic
process D has compact support, the collateral constraint sets a lower bound Bd (i.e., an upper
bound on bond issuance). Specifically, this is obtained by putting Dd in place of Dt and Lu in
place of Lt in equation (7).
Lastly, an upper bound on B can be obtained assuming that the proceeds from risk–free
investments made by the bank are taxed at a higher rate than the personal tax rate and that
floatation costs are positive. Specifically, assume that the current deposits D are all invested
in short term bonds, B, with no investments in loans. To further increase the investment in
bonds of one dollar, the bank must raise equity capital. A shareholder thus incurs a cost 1+λ,
where λ is the floatation cost. This additional dollar is invested at the risk–free rate, so that at
the end of the year, the proceeds of this investment that can be distributed are (1+rf (1−τ+)).
Alternatively, the shareholder can invest 1 + λ in a risk–free bond, obtaining (1 + λ)(1 + rf ).
Because τ+ ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0, then (1 + λ)(1 + rf ) ≥ (1 + rf (1 − τ+)), there is no incentive of
the bank to have a cash balance that is larger than D as long as either λ or τ+ are strictly
positive. The foregoing argument is made for simplicity. If the shareholders are taxed on their
investment proceeds at a rate τp, they obtain (1 + λ)(1 + rf (1 − τp)) from their investment
in the risk–free asset. If τp ≤ τ+, then (1 + λ)(1 + rf (1 − τp)) > (1 + rf (1 − τ+)), and the
bank has no incentive to increase the investment in risk–free bonds beyond D. Moreover, if
floatation costs associated with equity issuance are strictly increasing in the amount issued,
no assumption about differential tax rates are needed to establish an upper bound on B. In
conclusion, the feasible set of the bank can be assumed to be [0, Lu]× [Bd, Bu].
13Deposits and short term bonds are the cheapest form financing. If the same dollar were raised by issuing
equity, the cost would be higher due to both the higher cost of equity capital and to floatation costs. In this
case the upper bound would be even lower.
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Furthermore, standard arguments establish the existence of a unique value function E(x) =
E(L,B,D,Z,D′) that satisfies (15) and is continuous, increasing, and differentiable in all its
arguments, and concave in L. The existence and uniqueness of the value function E follow
from the Contraction Mapping Theorem (Theorem 3.2 in Stokey and Lucas (1989)). The
continuity, monotonicity, and concavity of the value function E in the argument L follow from
Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 9.5 in Stokey and Lucas (1989). The continuity and monotonicity of
E in B, D, Z, and D′ follow from the continuity and monotonicity of e in Z and D′ and the
Monotonicity of the Markov transition function of the process (Z,D).
B. A bank closure rule
The literature examining the impact of bank closure rules has typically analyzed setups under
some form of asymmetric information, obtaining results highly dependent on model specifica-
tion (see e.g. Kasa and Spiegel (2008) for a review of these models and empirical evidence).
While examining the optimality of bank closure rules is outside the scope of the paper, here
we illustrate how one such a rule can be viewed as a partial substitute of capital regulation
under specific assumptions about bank reorganization costs.
Consider a bank closure rule according to which a bank that has a negative accounting net
worth is taken over by the government and restructured. A similar rule has been conisdered
for example by Elizalde and Repullo (2007) and Zhu (2008)).
Formally, the bank is closed at time t if the ex–post net asset value (i.e., ex–post bank
capital, as opposed to Kt, which is the ex–ante bank capital) is negative:
vt = Lt +Bt −Dt + yt − τ(yt) = Kt + yt − τ(yt) < 0. (32)
The closure threshold is higher than the insolvency threshold, so this provision rules out
bank’s insolvency. As a consequence, current equity value is positive when this closure rule
applies. The equity value E(x) > 0 is expropriated from shareholders and is tranferred to
the government. New capital Kt+1 = Du − Dt+1 is injected. A key assumption is that the
government incurs direct restructuring costs, γ = 0. Under these assumptions, the closure
rule is superior to bank’s insolvency from the government’s view point, as a positive equity
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value is collected, while saving direct bankruptcy costs. Equation (20) is still valid in this case,
provided that ∆ is the indicator of the event {v < 0} and γ is set to zero.
When the bank is taken over by the government and Bt < 0 is fully collateralized, bond
holders, (old) depositors, and the government are paid in full.14 In this case, the financing
shortfall (net obligations minus available liquid funds) of the bank is (1 + rd)Dt− (1 + rf )Bt +
τ(yt) − (Dt+1 + pi(Lt)Zt). A portion of loan portfolio is liquidated in order to match (net of
fire sales costs) the shortfall, or
Lt − Lt+1 −m(Lt(1− δ)− Lt+1) = (1 + rd)Dt − (1 + rf )Bt + τ(yt)− (Dt+1 + pi(Lt)Zt).
From this equation, a new level of loans, L∗t+1, is determined. L∗t+1 is positive because the
bank satifies the collateral constraint. Clearly, in this reorganization procedure, an indirect
social cost is incurred because of loans fire sales costs, m(Lt(1− δ)− L∗t+1).
For the bank subject to this closure provision, the Bellman equation of the solution of
the bank’s program, when the bank is solvent (i.e., vt as defined in (32) is positive), is as in
equation (15). Note that under this closure rule, the value of the net payoff to the government
is defined by the recursive equation
G(x) = (1−∆(x)) (τ(y′) + βE[G(x′)])+ ∆(x) (E(x)− γD −Du +Dt+1) . (33)
with ∆ denoting the default indicator at x. If the bank is insolvent (∆ = 1), then the
government incurs direct bankruptcy costs γD, expropriates the shareholders getting E(x),
and it injects new equity capital Kt+1 = Du −Dt+1.
In Table VII, we compare the unregulated bank with a bank subject to the closure rule,
and the one just constrained to hold non–negative book equity (k = 0). It is apparent that the
bank closure rule has an impact similar to the requirement to hold non–negative book equity.
14This is because the collateral constraint in (7) is
Lt + pi(Lt)Zd + (1 + rf )Bt − (1 + rd)Dt − τ(ymint ) ≥ m(−Lt(1− δ))−Dd,
the closure rule in (32) is
Lt + pi(Lt)Zt + (1 + rf )Bt − (1 + rd)Dt − τ(yt) < 0,
and the left–hand–side of the second inequality is higher than the corresponding side of the first inequality.
Therefore, all stakeholders can be paid by liquidating the assets.
40
Relative to the unregulated bank, the closure rule results in an increase in loans, enterprise
and social values, the latter crucially depending on the assumption of no bank reorganization
costs. Note, however, that the rate of government intervention in closing and reopening banks
is very high, which suggests this rule might be more costly than the imposition of capital
requirements under the more realistic assumption of positive bank reorganization costs.
C. Algorithm
The solution of the Bellman equation in (15) is obtained numerically by a value iteration
algorithm. The valuation model for bank’s equity is a continuous–decision and infinite–horizon
Markov Decision Processes. The solution method is based on successive approximations of
the fixed point solution of the Bellman equation. Numerically, we apply this method to an
approximate discrete state-space and discrete decision valuation operator.15
Given the dynamics of Zt in (11) and of logDt in (12), using a vector notation ξ(t) =
(Z(t), logD(t)), we have a VAR of the form
ξ(t) = c+Kξ(t− 1) + ε(t) (34)
where ε = (εZ , εD) is a bivariate Normal variate with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ,
c =
(1− κ1)ξ1
(1− κ2)ξ2
 , K =
κ1 0
0 κ2
 , Σ =
 σ21 σ1σ2ρ
σ1σ2ρ σ
2
2
 ,
where, differently from the approach proposed in Tauchen (1986), Σ may be non–diagonal
and singular (when |ρ| = 1). We restrict the support of each stochastic process within three
times the unconditional standard deviation of the marginal distribution around the long term
average.
Given this alternative assumption for the error covariance matrix, we follow an efficient
approach first proposed by Knotek and Terry (2011) based on numerical integration of the
multivariate Normal distribution. In particular, the continuous–state process ξ(t) is approxi-
mated by a discrete–state process ξ̂(t), which varies on the finite grid {X1, X2, . . . , Xn} ⊂ R2.
15See Rust (1996) or Burnside (1999) for a survey on numerical methods for continuous decision infinite
horizon Markov Decision Processes.
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Define a partition of R2 made of n non–overlapping 2–dimensional intervals {X1,X2, . . . ,Xn}
such that Xi ∈ Xi for all i = 1, . . . , n and ∪ni=1Xi = R2. The n × n transition matrix Π is
defined as
Πi,j = Prob
{
ξ̂(t+ 1) ∈ Xj | ξ̂(t) = Xi
}
= Prob {c+Kξ(t) + ε(t+ 1) ∈ Xj}
= Prob
{
ε(t+ 1) ∈ X ′j
}
=
∫
X ′j
φ(ξ, 0,Σ)dξ
where X ′j = Xj−c−Kξ(t), and φ(ξ, 0,Σ) is the density of the bivariate Normal with mean zero
and covariance matrix Σ. The integral on the last line is computed numerically by Monte–
Carlo integration. We select the grid points for each variable based on approximately equal
weighting from the univariate normal cumulative distribution function.
The feasible interval for loans, [0, Lu], and for the face value of bonds, [Bd, Bu] (with
Bd < 0 < Bu), is set so that they are never binding for the equity maximizing program. We
discretize [Ld, Lu], to obtain a grid of NL points
L˜ =
{
L˜j = Lu(1− δ)j | j = 1, . . . , NL − 1
}
∪ {LNL = 0}
such that, if the bank choose inaction, the loan’s level is what remains after the portion δL
has been repaid. The interval [Bd, Bu] is discretized into Nb equally–spaced values, making up
the set B˜. To keep the notation simple, we denote x = (ξ, L,B) the generic element of the
discretized state.
We solve the problem
E(x) = max
{
0, max
(L′,B′)∈A(D)
{
e(x, L′, B′) + βE
[
E(x′)
]}}
,
where function e(x, L,B), is defined in equation (10), and A(D) is the case specific feasible
set defined differently for the unregulated and the regulated case, in all points of the discrete
state space. The solution is found by successive approximations, starting from a guess function
E0(·), putting it on the right–hand–side of the Bellman equation obtaining E1(·) and than by
iterating on the same procedure obtaining the sequence {En(·), n = 0, 1, . . .}. The procedure
is terminated when the error ‖Ej+1 − Ej‖ is lower than the desired tolerance.
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For the set of parameters in Table I, we use Lu = 10, Bd = −5 and Bu = 5. Given the
properties of the quadrature scheme, we solve the model using only 9 points for Z, 9 points for
Dt. However, we need to allow for many more points when discretizing the control variables,
so we choose NL = 27, and NB = 36. The tolerance for termination of the iterative procedure
is set at 10−5.
Given the optimal solution, we can determine the optimal policy and the transition function
ϕ(x) in (16) based on the arg-max of equity value at the discrete states x. We use Monte
Carlo simulation to generate a sample of Ω possible future paths (or scenarios) for the bank.
In particular, we obtain the simulated dynamics of the state variable ξ = (Z,D) by application
of the recursive formula in (34), starting from Z(0) = Z and D(0) = Dd. Then, setting a
feasible initial choice L(0) = 0 and B(0) = Du (so that the initial bank capital is Du−Dd), we
apply the transition function ϕ along each simulated path recursively. If a bank defaults at a
given step, then the current depositors receive the full value of their claim, while the deposit
insurance agency pays the bankruptcy cost. Afterwards, a seed capital Du −Dd is injected in
the bank. Together with deposit Dd, the total amount Du is momentarily invested in bonds,
B = Du, while L = 0. Then the “new” bank follows on the same path by applying the optimal
policy. In our numerical experiments, we generate simulated samples with Ω = 10, 000 paths
and T = 100 years (steps). To limit the dependence of our results on the initial conditions, we
drop the first 50 steps.
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| | |
(Lt, Bt)
Zt−1
Dt
→ Zt
Dt+1
(Lt+1, Bt+1)
→ Zt+1
Dt+2
(Lt+2, Bt+2)
. . . t− 1 t t+ 1 . . .
Figure 1: Bank’s dynamic. Evolution of the state variables (credit shock, Z, and deposits, D) and
of the bank’s control variables (cash and liquid investments, B, and loans, L) assuming the bank is
solvent at each date.
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Figure 2: Comparison of constraints. This figure presents the three feasible regions of (L,B)
defined by the collateral constraint, Γ(D) in Equation (8), the capital requirement, Θ(D) from (23),
and by the liquidity requirement, Λ(D) from Equation (26). The plot is based on the parameter values
in Table I, for a current D = 2.
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Figure 3: Bank’s policy. This figure illustrates the impact of regulatory restrictions on the bank’s
policy related to loan investment and to short term investment and financing with bonds, for the non–
regulated case, for the cases with capital constraint, and with both capital and liquidity constraints
altogether. The short term investment/financing policy is given by the optimal B∗ given the current
state, averaged across all possible Z in the left panel and averaged across all possible D′ in the right
panel. The loan investment policy is represented by the ratio L∗/L given the current state and averaged
across Z in the left panel and across D′ in the right panel. These values are plotted against the liquidity
shock, D′−D, in the left panels and the credit shock, Z, on loans in the right panels, and are obtained
assuming that the bank is currently at the steady state (so that the credit shock is 0.0717, and the
deposits from the previous date are D = 2, respectively), while B = 0, and L = 4.1 so that bank capital
is K = 2.1. The values are from the numerical solution of the model using 9 points for Z, 9 points for
D, 27 points for L, and 36 points for B, based on the parameter values in Table I.
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Figure 4: Value loss associated with regulatory restrictions. This figure illustrates the impact
of regulatory restrictions by comparing the enterprise value (i.e., market value of deposits plus market
value of equity net of cash balance, or plus short term debt), and the social value (i.e., book value of
deposits plus market value of equity plus the value to the government, plus the present value of issuance
costs) of the bank, for the case with capital constraint, and with both capital and liquidity constraints
as a proportion of the value from the non–regulated case. These values are plotted against the shock
on deposits, D′ − D, in the left panels and the credit shock, Z, on loans in the right panels, and are
obtained assuming that the bank is currently at the steady state (so that the credit shock is 0.0717,
and the deposits from the previous date are D = 2, respectively), while B = 0, and L = 4.1 so that
bank capital is K = 2.1. The values are from the numerical solution of the model using 9 points for Z,
9 points for D, 27 points for L, and 36 points for B, based on the parameter values in Table I.
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κZ annual persistence of the credit shock 0.88
σZ annual conditional std. dev. of the credit shock 0.0139
Z unconditional average of the credit shock 0.0717
κD annual persistence of the log of deposits 0.95
σD annual conditional std. dev. of the log of deposits 0.0209
D unconditional average of deposits $2
ρ correlation between log–deposit and credit shock -0.85
β annual discount factor 0.95
rf annual risk–free rate on bonds 2%
rd annual rate on deposits 0%
τ+ corporate tax rate for positive earnings 15%
τ− corporate tax rate for negative earnings 5%
δ annual percentage of reimbursed loan 20%
γ bankruptcy costs 0.1
λ flotation cost for equity 0.1
α return to scale for loan investment 0.90
m+ unit price for loan investment 0.03
m− unit price for loan fire sales 0.04
k percentage of loans for capital regulation 4%
` liquidity coverage ratio 20%
τB tax rate on uninsured liabilities 0
Table I: Base case model parameters
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Z 0.019 0.037 0.054 0.072 0.089 0.107 0.124
Unregulated
K = 2.22 -0.270 -0.228 -0.173 -0.173 -0.106 -0.090 -0.081
K = 2.18 -0.270 -0.228 -0.173 -0.173 -0.106 -0.090 -0.063
K = 2.14 -0.270 -0.228 -0.173 -0.167 -0.106 -0.072 -0.055
K = 2.10 -0.306 -0.262 -0.173 -0.167 -0.106 -0.046 -0.037
K = 2.05 -0.407 -0.326 -0.287 -0.230 -0.161 -0.074 -0.028
Capital
K = 2.22 0.068 0.073 0.073 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071
K = 2.18 0.082 0.073 0.073 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071
K = 2.14 0.082 0.073 0.073 0.071 0.071 0.080 0.080
K = 2.10 0.115 0.084 0.084 0.071 0.080 0.080 0.089
K = 2.05 0.074 0.088 0.091 0.067 0.089 0.098 0.098
Capital & liquidity
K = 2.22 0.240 0.264 0.309 0.372 0.372 0.377 0.383
K = 2.18 0.233 0.240 0.309 0.352 0.372 0.377 0.383
K = 2.14 0.233 0.240 0.287 0.331 0.372 0.377 0.383
K = 2.10 0.203 0.233 0.264 0.309 0.352 0.377 0.383
K = 2.05 0.171 0.171 0.179 0.257 0.301 0.352 0.358
Table II: Capital ratio. Average capital ratio (i.e., bank capital over loans, or (L∗ + B∗ −D′)/L∗,
where (L∗, B∗) is the optimal solution for a solvent bank and D′ is the new possible level of deposits)
as a function of the credit shock, Z, at different levels of current bank capital, K = L + B −D. The
average is computed over the different possible levels of D′. The average capital ratio is computed at
B = 0. The current level of L is 4.1. The different levels of K are obtained by changing D. These
results are based on the numerical solution of the valuation problem in (15) using 9 points for Z, 9
points for D, 27 points for L, and 36 points for B, based on the parameter values in Table I.
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Z 0.019 0.037 0.054 0.072 0.089 0.107 0.124
Unregulated
K = 2.22 -8.208 -9.542 -10.268 -10.268 -12.680 -12.808 -12.398
K = 2.18 -8.208 -9.542 -10.268 -10.268 -12.680 -12.808 -11.722
K = 2.14 -8.208 -9.542 -10.268 -10.570 -12.680 -12.344 -11.526
K = 2.10 -7.258 -8.201 -10.268 -10.570 -12.680 -11.372 -11.266
K = 2.05 -5.870 -6.618 -7.363 -8.587 -9.870 -10.453 -11.141
Capital
K = 2.22 -4.751 -6.070 -6.070 -9.318 -9.318 -9.318 -9.318
K = 2.18 -4.342 -6.070 -6.070 -9.318 -9.318 -9.318 -9.318
K = 2.14 -4.342 -6.070 -6.070 -9.318 -9.318 -9.121 -9.121
K = 2.10 -3.169 -5.661 -5.661 -9.318 -9.121 -9.121 -8.854
K = 2.05 -2.755 -3.908 -4.317 -7.042 -8.712 -8.445 -8.445
Capital & liquidity
K = 2.22 0.433 0.473 0.578 0.907 0.907 0.691 0.550
K = 2.18 0.489 0.433 0.578 0.753 0.907 0.691 0.550
K = 2.14 0.489 0.433 0.520 0.652 0.907 0.691 0.550
K = 2.10 0.677 0.489 0.473 0.578 0.753 0.691 0.550
K = 2.05 0.799 0.799 0.743 0.707 0.839 0.753 0.612
Table III: Liquidity coverage ratio. Average liquidity coverage ratio (i.e., end–of–period total cash
available in the worst case scenario over the end–of–period net cash outflows due to a variation in
deposits, or (δL∗ + pi(L∗)Zd − τ(ymin) +B∗(1 + rf ))/(D′(1 + rd)−Dd), where (L∗, B∗) is the optimal
solution for a solvent bank and D′ is the new possible level of deposits) as a function of the credit
shock, Z, at different levels of current bank capital, K = L+B−D. The average is computed over the
different possible levels of D′. The average capital ratio is computed at B = 0. The current level of L
is 4.1. The different levels of K are obtained by changing D. These results are based on the numerical
solution of the valuation problem in (15) using 9 points for Z, 9 points for D, 27 points for L, and 36
points for B, based on the parameter values in Table I.
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Unregulated Capital Capital & Liquidity
base base k = 12% base
k = 12% k = 4%
` = 20% ` = 50%
Loan (book) 4.78 6.37 5.90 2.68 2.67 2.65
Net Bond Holdings (book) -3.48 -3.89 -3.05 0.16 0.22 0.26
Bank Capital (book) -0.70 0.47 0.84 0.82 0.87 0.90
Equity (mkt) 4.49 4.87 4.90 3.69 3.72 3.74
Deposits (mkt) 1.89 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91
Enterprise Value (mkt) 9.88 10.71 9.90 5.43 5.40 5.38
Government Value (mkt) 0.54 0.88 0.85 0.37 0.37 0.37
Social value (mkt) 10.56 11.72 10.87 5.91 5.89 5.86
Default/Closure Rate (pct) 5.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table IV: The impact of bank regulation. These results are obtained from the solution of the bank
valuation problem using 9 points for Z, 9 points for D, 27 points for L, and 36 points for B, and the
parameters in Table I. The optimal policy is then applied to 10,000 random paths of 50 periods (years)
length for the credit and liquidity shocks. The table presents the median of the time series averages
(computed on non–defaulted instances) of the different metrics. The columns represent different choices
of parameters: the column denoted “base”, is the base case, with the parameters in Table I. The others
are obtained by changing only the parameter(s) we use to denominate the column. The results are
presented for the unregulated case, the case with capital ratio restrictions, and the case with both
capital and liquidity restrictions.
Capital Capital & liquidity
base τ τB base τ τB
Loan (book) 6.37 6.09 5.89 2.68 2.48 2.63
Net Bond Holdings (book) -3.89 -3.62 -3.44 0.16 0.24 0.21
Bank Capital (book) 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.82 0.70 0.81
Equity (mkt) 4.87 4.49 4.46 3.69 3.38 3.65
Deposits (mkt) 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91
Enterprise Value (mkt) 10.71 10.06 9.84 5.43 5.05 5.34
Government Value (mkt) 0.88 1.14 1.10 0.37 0.48 0.38
Social value (mkt) 11.72 11.31 11.05 5.91 5.64 5.83
Table V: The impact of taxation. These results are obtained from the solution of the bank valuation
problem using 9 points for Z, 9 points for D, 27 points for L, and 36 points for B, and the parameters
in Table I. The optimal policy is then applied to 10,000 random paths of 50 periods (years) length for
the credit and liquidity shocks. The table shows, respectively, from left to right a regulated bank with
capital requirement, and a regulated bank subject to both capital and liquidity restrictions. The table
presents the median of the time series averages (computed on non–defaulted instances) of the different
metrics. The columns represent different choices of parameters: the column denoted “base”, is the base
case, with the parameters in Table I. The others are obtained by changing only the parameter(s) we
use to denominate the column: “τ” is with τ+ = 20% and τ− = 7.5%; in “τB” we set τB = 0.005.
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Unregulated base λ = 0 λ = .2 m− = .08 δ = .1
Capital
Loan (book) 4.78 6.37 6.45 6.29 6.46 8.55
Net Bond Holdings (book) -3.48 -3.89 -3.95 -3.80 -3.97 -5.51
Bank Capital (book) -0.70 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.48 1.04
Equity (mkt) 4.49 4.87 4.90 4.85 4.87 6.70
Enterprise Value (mkt) 9.88 10.71 10.84 10.60 10.79 14.09
Government Value (mkt) 0.54 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.89 1.14
Social value (mkt) 10.56 11.72 11.85 11.60 11.80 15.34
Capital & liquidity
Loan (book) 4.78 2.68 3.15 2.47 2.72 3.47
Net Bond Holdings (book) -3.48 0.16 0.05 0.23 0.13 0.19
Bank Capital (book) -0.70 0.82 1.21 0.70 0.83 1.68
Equity (mkt) 4.49 3.69 4.18 3.51 3.70 4.70
Enterprise Value (mkt) 9.88 5.43 6.02 5.19 5.47 6.40
Government Value (mkt) 0.54 0.37 0.44 0.34 0.37 0.49
Social value (mkt) 10.56 5.91 6.58 5.64 5.96 7.02
Table VI: The role of equity issuance costs, adjustment costs and maturity transformation.
These results are obtained from the solution of the bank valuation problem using 9 points for Z, 9 points
for D, 27 points for L, and 36 points for B, and the parameters in Table I. The optimal policy is then
applied to 10,000 random paths of 50 periods (years) length for the credit and liquidity shocks. The
table shows two panels: above the case of a bank with capital requirement, and below the case of
a bank subject to both capital and liquidity restrictions. The table presents the median of the time
series averages (computed on non–defaulted instances) of the different metrics. The columns represent
different choices of parameters: the column denoted “base”, is the base case, with the parameters in
Table I. The others are obtained by changing only the parameter used to denominate the column (e.g.,
in “λ = 0” all the parameters are at the base case value, but λ, which is set to zero).
Unregulated k = 0 Closure
Loan (book) 4.78 6.14 5.60
Net Bond Holdings (book) -3.48 -3.82 -3.37
Bank Capital (book) -0.70 0.31 0.25
Equity (mkt) 4.49 4.82 5.48
Enterprise Value (mkt) 9.88 10.58 10.76
Government Value (mkt) 0.54 0.86 0.76
Social value (mkt) 10.56 11.56 11.63
Default/Closure Rate (pct) 5.34 0 21.75
Table VII: A bank closure rule. Comparison between a bank closure rule, a bank subject to hold
nonnegative book equity, and the unregulated bank. These results are obtained from the solution of
the bank valuation problem using 9 points for Z, 9 points for D, 27 points for L, and 36 points for
B, and the parameters in Table I. The optimal policy is then applied to 10,000 random paths of 50
periods (years) length for the credit and liquidity shocks. The table shows the median of the time series
averages (computed on non–defaulted instances) of the different metrics. The columns represent the
case with unregulated banks, the case with nonnegative book equity requirement k = 0, and the case
with banks subject to the closure rule.
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